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Secular Invocations, the First
Amendment, and the Promise of
Religious Pluralism
Jay Wexler*
INTRODUCTION

The question posed by the Symposium is: “Is This a Christian
Nation?” As someone who has recently published a book called
“Our Non-Christian Nation,”1 it was probably clear to the
organizers what my view would be on the matter. In that book, I
described how, in a series of decisions over the course of the past
two decades, the Supreme Court has opened up public life—
government property, institutions, and money—to religion and
how, even though those decisions all of course benefitted the
nation’s Christian majority, recently, non-Christians, including
Atheists and other secularists, have rightly begun taking
advantage of those decisions to participate in public life alongside
the majority.2
Thus, when the Court held in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris and
Mitchell v. Helms that the government has wide discretion to funnel
public money to Christian schools,3 Muslim schools and

* Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. Many thanks to
Conner Kingsley for terrific research assistance and to the organizers of the “Is
This a Christian Nation?” conference for inviting me to participate.
1. JAY WEXLER, OUR NON-CHRISTIAN NATION: HOW ATHEISTS, SATANISTS,
PAGANS, AND OTHERS ARE DEMANDING THEIR RIGHTFUL PLACE IN PUBLIC LIFE
(2019).
2. Id. at 6–8.
3. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 662–63 (2002); Mitchell v.
Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 801 (2000).

620

2021]

IS THIS A CHRISTIAN NATION?

621

organizations representing all types of religious beliefs, from
Scientology to the Hare Krishnas, started asking for (and receiving)
public money as well.4 When the Court in Good News Club v.
Milford Central School held that public schools must allow
proselytizing Christian groups to use their classrooms after the end
of the school day,5 secularists and Satanists started running their
own clubs in those same classrooms.6 When the Court held in
Capitol Square Review and Advisory Board v. Pinette that the
government can let private Christian groups put up their displays
and monuments on government property opened up as a public
forum,7 Wiccans and Atheists started putting up their own
monuments in those forums.8 And when the Court said in Town of
Greece v. Galloway that town boards can start their meetings off
with sectarian prayers, so long as they do not discriminate on the
basis of religion,9 individuals with all sorts of religious and
nonreligious beliefs, from Hindus to Pagans to Satanists to
secularists, started asking to give their own invocations, and many
have in fact done so.10
This phenomenon represents the fact that religious minorities
(and nonbelievers, though from here on in I will simply include
nonbelievers as a type of religious minority) have largely recognized
that the Supreme Court is no longer particularly interested in
keeping religion and the government separate. Prior to the Court’s
recent rightwing turn, exemplified by the appointment of
separation skeptics such as Samuel Alito and Neil Gorsuch, the
typical approach taken by minorities to church-state relations was
to stay out of public life and fight in the courts for a jurisprudence
more amenable to separationism.11 After all, one of the great
promises of the Establishment Clause has always been to protect
minorities from both the symbolic and substantive dominance of the
4. See WEXLER, supra note 1, at 113, 115, 117, 120–21, 123.
5. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 112 (2001).
6. See WEXLER, supra note 1, at 149–51.
7. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 769–
70 (1995).
8. See WEXLER, supra note 1, at 44–49.
9. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 591–92 (2014).
10. See WEXLER, supra note 1, at 63.
11. See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 681 (2005); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 643–44 (2002).
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Christian majority by creating a largely religion-free zone of public
life where everyone, regardless of their religious views, feels equally
valued and respected. But as the Court’s approach to the
Establishment Clause has changed over time (it is notable that the
Court has not invalidated a single government practice under the
clause in over fifteen years12) and with the recent personnel
changes practically guaranteeing that this trend will continue for
at least another generation, religious minorities have realized that
we (as an Atheist I include myself here) need a new strategy to at
least try to counter the dominance of the Christian majority in what
might accurately now be described as a “post-separationist”
America.
In Our Non-Christian Nation, I argued that while a secular
public square might be the ideal from the perspective of religious
minorities, the religiously cacophonous public square created by
this new movement is both the best option for minorities given the
circumstances at the Supreme Court and, in fact, presents at least
some unique possibilities to promote the interests of minorities
even compared to the hypothetical secular public square.13 For
instance, participating in public life can be experienced as
empowering for religious minorities in a way that staying away
from it cannot be, and a public square filled with religious and
nonreligious voices of all kinds might result in a citizenry better
educated with respect to religion and religious diversity than an
entirely secular public square.14 Moreover, although the question
is an empirical one with no clear answer yet, it is at least possible
that a religiously diverse public square might result in more
toleration and mutual respect among those who hold different
beliefs and create the conditions for a more stable social peace than
pure separationism.15 In any event, insisting on participating
alongside Christians in public life has got to be a better option from
the perspective of religious minorities than ceding the public square
entirely to the majority. Given that the Supreme Court does not
seem like it will be turning the clock back on its Establishment
12. See McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 901–02 (2005) (Scalia,
J., dissenting); see also, e.g., Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n., 139 S. Ct.
2067, 2074 (2019); Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 591–92.
13. See WEXLER, supra note 1, at 162–66.
14. See id. at 162–65.
15. See id. at 165–66.
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Clause jurisprudence any time soon, religious minorities are right
to recognize that creation of a robust religious and nonreligious
public pluralism is the best current option in a world of few other
opportunities.
Such pluralism, however, requires that the courts continue to
recognize the dangers of discrimination. The saving grace of the
current Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence has
been its fairly consistent embrace of the notion that while the
government can support religion in all sorts of ways, it cannot
formally discriminate in its allocation of public goods among
recipients based on the content of their religious or nonreligious
commitments. As the Court famously stated in its 1982 decision of
Larson v. Valente, “[t]he clearest command of the Establishment
Clause is that one religious denomination cannot be officially
preferred over another.”16 As long as this principle remains
ascendant, the possibility of a religiously cacophonous public
square continues to exist—Christians can access government
money, property, and institutions, but so can non-Christians.
Christians can put up monuments on public property opened up to
private speech, but so can Hindus, Taoists, and Zoroastrians, if they
so choose. Christian schools and organizations can use public
money to further their missions, but so can Krishnas, Muslims, and
Satanists. Christians can start after-school clubs to promote their
beliefs in public elementary and secondary schools, but so can Jews,
Buddhists, and Confucians. Christians can give invocations before
town board meetings, but so can Wiccans, Sikhs, and Rastafarians.
For this pluralism to be anywhere near adequate, however,
government resources must be equally available to nonreligious
individuals and organizations, fully authorized to articulate
nonreligious perspectives on questions typically addressed by
religion. In other words, a pluralism in which the only belief
systems accorded the same treatment as Christianity are those that
believe in some sort of divine being or have some other hallmark of
traditional religion is a partial pluralism at best. Nonreligious
belief systems such as Ethical Culture or Secular Humanism seek
to answer the same questions that religious belief systems
address—what is the ultimate meaning of life, how are human
beings related to the rest of the cosmos, what constitutes ethical
human action, how can human beings find community, etc.? A
16. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982).
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public square that excludes these nonreligious alternatives to
understanding fundamental issues relating to the place of human
beings (among others) in the universe would be one that arbitrarily
excludes the views of a substantial portion of the American
population. After all, although statistics like these are always
rightfully subject to legitimate quibbling at the margins, the data
show that somewhere around twenty-five percent of the population
of the United States describe themselves as not believing in any
religious belief system whatsoever.17
Thus, to return to my examples, if we really care about
religious pluralism, and monuments to Christ and Buddha and
Satan can stand on public property opened to private speech, then
a monument to Ethical Culture must be allowed as well. If
Buddhist and Christian and Hindu student groups can meet in
public school classrooms after the school day is over to promulgate
their beliefs, then secular groups must have the same courtesy. If
Scientologists and Krishnas and Christians can receive government
funding for their social service organizations, then Humanist
groups must be able to apply for the same funding sources. And if
Wiccans, Muslims, and Christians can give invocations before town
board meetings, then Atheists must be allowed to the same.
Moreover, they must be allowed to freely express their nonreligious
beliefs in as “sectarian” a manner as anybody else.
On this score, there is both good news and bad news. The major
good news is that, with respect to three of the four contexts I am
describing—putting up displays and monuments, applying for
government funding, and creating after-school programming—the
bedrock First Amendment free speech principle that the
government may not discriminate against speakers on the basis of
viewpoint has, for the most part, resulted in the government
formally treating Atheists and other secularists equally with
religious believers.18 True, many attempts by secularists to take
advantage of these opportunities have been met with hostility from
government actors and dissenting individuals (Our Non-Christian
Nation catalogs many of these incidents, including Atheist displays
being torn down and school officials discouraging secular students

17. See WEXLER, supra note 1, at 6.
18. See WEXLER, supra note 1, at 44–49, 120–21, 149–51; see also Wallace
v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 52–54 (1985).
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from starting their own organizations19), but at least the law on the
books protects the rights of those who describe themselves as
nonreligious on an equal basis with religious believers.20
The other bit of good news has to do with secular invocations.
Not long after Justice Kennedy made clear in Town of Greece that
government units sponsoring invocations must “maintain[ ] a policy
of nondiscrimination,”21 Atheists and other secularists, both
individually and in connection with organizations like Americans
United for Separation of Church and State, the Freedom from
Religion Foundation, and the Central Florida Freethought
Community, began asking to give their own invocations before town
meetings and were invited to do so by cities and towns and states
across the country.22 Nobody knows for sure how many secular
invocations have been offered nationwide, but the number is likely
somewhere between one hundred and two hundred.23 Some of
these secular invocations caused controversy, of course, but many
of them proceeded without incident.24 Invocations are particularly
useful from the perspective of religious pluralism because they
allow the speaker to talk about their deeply held beliefs to a
basically captive audience of mostly politically active local
citizens.25 An invocation, as we will see, can essentially serve as a
short lesson about the content of a belief system as well as
demonstrate to a perhaps ignorant audience that those who hold
such beliefs are themselves responsible and thoughtful members of
the community.26 This is at least as true for secularists as it is for
those who believe in traditional religions. Perhaps nothing better
has come from the Court’s line of separation-eroding church-state
decisions than the upsurge of invocations given by religious
minorities, including secularists.

19. See WEXLER, supra note 1, at 47–48, 149.
20. See id. at 7.
21. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S 565, 585 (2014).
22. See infra notes 73–105 and accompanying text.
23. See infra note 87 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 99–103 and accompanying text.
25. For some examples of secular invocations, see infra notes 92–96 and
accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 95–96 and accompanying text.
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Alas, this is where the distressing news comes in. In response
to the increasing demand for secular invocations, several
jurisdictions—Brevard County, Florida; the Pennsylvania House of
Representatives; and the United States House of Representatives,
most prominently—have declared their invocation practices offlimits to nonbelievers.27 In each case, secularists, supported by
separationist legal groups, challenged these policies in the courts
as violations of their First Amendment rights and, in particular, the
part of Town of Greece prohibiting the government from
discriminating when it selects who will give invocations before
public meetings.28 All three cases were ultimately decided by
federal circuit courts, with the government winning two out of the
three disputes.29
Specifically, challengers won in Florida but lost in both the
Pennsylvania and the United States Houses of Representatives. In
Williamson v. Brevard County, the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals avoided the question of whether the government can solely
exclude secularists from its invocation programs based on its
finding that the county board had in fact discriminated against a
wide variety of minority religious faiths when selecting prayergivers.30 In Fields v. Speaker of the Pennsylvania House of
Representatives, a split panel of the Third Circuit held that the
Pennsylvania House was within its rights to exclude Atheists from
its invocation program given that one of the primary purposes of its
invocations was to ask for “divine guidance.”31 And in Barker v.
Conroy, the D.C. Circuit, in an opinion by supposedly-liberal legallion David Tatel, summarily upheld the U.S. House of
Representatives’ policy of excluding secular invocations by pointing
to the historical tradition of legislative prayer in the United

27. See infra notes Section III.A.; see also Williamson v. Brevard County,
928 F.3d 1296, 1298 (11th Cir. 2019); Fields v. Speaker of Pa. H.R., 936 F.3d
142, 146 (3d Cir. 2019); Barker v. Conroy, 921 F.3d 1118, 1121 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
28. Williamson, 928 F.3d at 1298; Fields, 936 F.3d at 147; Barker, 921 F.3d
at 1121.
29. Williamson, 928 F.3d at 1317; Fields, 936 F.3d at 163; Barker, 921 F.3d
at 1131–32.
30. See Williamson, 928 F.3d at 1316.
31. Fields, 936 F.3d at 147.
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States,32 which, true enough, has likely not included many secular
prayers.
In this Article, I will argue that the decisions of the Third and
D.C. Circuits are poorly reasoned, violate the basic First
Amendment principle that the government may not discriminate
on the basis of religion or viewpoint, wrongly sidestep the Supreme
Court’s admonition in Town of Greece that legislative prayer
practices must be nondiscriminatory, and threaten to substantially
undermine the religious pluralism that is the only real advantage
to the Court’s recent pro-religion Establishment Clause
jurisprudence. While the Court’s references in Town of Greece to
non-discrimination norms are far from fully developed or crystal
clear in their import, the best reading of them suggests that they
constitute an additional requirement beyond whatever might be
justified by the nation’s historical practices regarding invocations
before public meetings. The requirement of non-discrimination
incorporates the basic, modern First Amendment principles that
the government may not discriminate amongst religions or between
religion and non-religion and that it may not discriminate on the
basis of viewpoint when allocating public resources such as the
opportunity to speak before government bodies.33 A practice that
fits within our historical tradition of legislative prayer but fails the
non-discrimination requirement should be held unconstitutional.
Of course, the government need not provide everyone who
wants to speak before a public meeting an opportunity to do so,
regardless of what they might say; in other words, nobody has the
right to give an invocation about their favorite football team or the
state of their marriage or even necessarily about the importance of
a pristine environment. Under ordinary principles of First
Amendment law as it applies in designated public forums, the
government may limit the subject matter of invocations even if it
may not exclude speech because of its viewpoint.34 Fleshing out
this requirement, I argue for the following approach: Subject to
certain content-neutral requirements (regarding timing, for
example, or even perhaps the speaker’s geographical connection to
the relevant government body), the government must treat as
32. Barker, 921 F.3d at 1131.
33. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 585–88 (2014).
34. See Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819,
829–30 (1995).
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equals, for purposes of determining who may give an invocation,
any person who purports to speak on behalf of a belief system that
would violate the Establishment Clause if it were put forward by
the government as truth.35 Since the government would violate the
Establishment Clause just as surely by proclaiming that there is no
god as it would if it proclaimed that Jesus is the son of God or that
Thetans must clear the planet, then it follows that the government
may not exclude those speaking on behalf of Atheist organizations
from giving invocations before public meetings.
The Article proceeds as follows: In Part I, I describe briefly the
Supreme Court’s two decisions on legislative prayer, Marsh v.
Chambers and Town of Greece v. Galloway, and argue that the
insistence in those cases that the government maintain a policy of
non-discrimination when implementing pre-meeting prayer
practices constitutes an additional obligation beyond the
requirement that the practice falls within the nation’s historical
traditions. In Part II, I describe the response of religious minorities
to Town of Greece, focusing specifically on the coordinated
movement among Atheists and others to offer secular invocations
before government bodies across the country, including in some
surprising conservative southern locales. By looking at some
specific examples of secular invocations given in the past few years,
I argue that the secular invocation represents a unique opportunity
to promote religious pluralism in the United States by allowing
secularists to explain their beliefs before captive audiences of
politically-active citizens. I argue that government bodies should
allow—indeed, should welcome, even solicit—secular invocations as
a way of furthering religious pluralism. In Part III, I turn to the
courts and the First Amendment. Section A of that Part describes
the three judicial decisions on the issue of whether excluding
Atheists from invocation practices violates the First Amendment.
Section B of that Part critiques the decisions of the D.C. and Third
Circuits and then offers a practical test for determining the proper
set of possible invocation-givers within which courts should enforce
the non-discrimination requirement of Town of Greece—a set that
must include secularists.

35. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV.
46, 48–51 (1987).
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THE SUPREME COURT AND LEGISLATIVE PRAYER

The Supreme Court has decided two cases about the
constitutionality of starting government meetings with a prayer or
invocation—Marsh v. Chambers in 1983,36 and Town of Greece v.
Galloway in 2014.37 The issue in Marsh was whether the Nebraska
legislature’s practice of starting every session off with a prayer
offered by its publicly-funded Presbyterian chaplain, Robert
Palmer, violated the First Amendment.38 In a six–three decision
authored by Chief Justice Burger, the Court upheld the Nebraska
House’s practice.39 The decision was thinly reasoned and failed
entirely to grapple with any of the potential harms of legislative
prayer that Justices Brennan and Stevens identified in their
dissents.40 Instead, Burger rested his conclusion of
constitutionality simply on the grounds that the Nebraska House’s
practice fit comfortably within the nation’s historical tradition of
legislative prayer.41 Noting that the same Congress that drafted
the Bill of Rights, including the First Amendment, had just days
earlier passed a statute authorizing payment for House and Senate
chaplains, the majority opinion concluded that, “[c]learly the men
who wrote the First Amendment Religion Clauses did not view paid
legislative chaplains and opening prayers as a violation of that
Amendment.”42 The key language in the decision reads as follows:
The opening of sessions of legislative and other
deliberative public bodies with prayer is deeply embedded
in the history and tradition of this country. From colonial
times through the founding of the Republic and ever since,
the practice of legislative prayer has coexisted with the
principles of disestablishment and religious freedom. . . .
....

36. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 784 (1983).
37. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 569–70 (2014).
38. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 784–85.
39. Id. at 795.
40. See id. at 795–98 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see id. at 822–24 (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
41. Id. at 790, 793 (majority opinion).
42. Id. at 788.
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In light of the unambiguous and unbroken history of
more than 200 years, there can be no doubt that the
practice of opening legislative sessions with prayer has
become part of the fabric of our society. To invoke Divine
guidance on a public body entrusted with making the laws
is not, in these circumstances, an “establishment” of
religion or a step toward establishment; it is simply a
tolerable acknowledgement of beliefs widely held among
the people of this country.43
The primary holding of the case, then, is that, in general,
legislative prayers do not violate the Establishment Clause because
legislatures in the United States, both at the national and state
levels, have started their sessions with prayers throughout the
country’s history, reaching back to even before the final language of
the Establishment Clause was finished.44 But that is not the only
point of law contained in the opinion. In the brief, four-paragraph
third section of the opinion, the Court also rejected claims that
particular aspects of the Nebraska practice violated the
Establishment Clause, including the fact that Palmer had occupied
the chaplain’s office for sixteen years and that his prayers were
“Judeo-Christian” in nature. 45 The seeds of understanding Town
of Greece’s non-discrimination requirement can be found in the
Court’s answer to these arguments.
As to the first of these objections, the Court found that the
selection of a single person was acceptable because it did not
“advanc[e] the beliefs of a particular church”46 and because there
was no proof that his continued selection had “stemmed from an
impermissible motive.”47 Rather, the Court found Palmer had been
“reappointed because his performance and personal qualities were
acceptable to the body appointing him.”48 The Court’s assertion
that choosing one person from one denomination to be the chaplain
for sixteen straight years does not advance that denomination is of
course quite ludicrous, but the important doctrinal point is that the
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. at 786, 792.
See id. at 787–89.
Id. at 792–95.
Id. at 793.
Id.
Id.
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Court seems to have added here a new requirement for legislative
prayer—it must not “advance[ ] the beliefs of a particular church.”49
By inference, if the Court had found that the practice in Nebraska
had “advance[d] the beliefs of a particular church,” presumably
because of some “impermissible motive” of the legislature, then the
practice would have violated the Establishment Clause.50 In
response to the challenger’s objection to the “Judeo-Christian”
nature of Palmer’s prayers, the Court said that “[t]he content of the
prayer is not of concern to judges where, as here, there is no
indication that the prayer opportunity has been exploited to
proselytize or advance any one, or to disparage any other, faith or
belief.”51 This suggests that not only must a legislative prayer
practice (1) not advance a belief or church, but it also must (2) not
proselytize, and (3) not disparage any faith or belief.
Almost everything about these requirements is a mystery.
With regard to their content—what counts as advancement or
proselytization or disparagement—the only thing we know from
Marsh is that appointment of one chaplain for sixteen years does
not constitute “advancing” a belief. We certainly do not know why
that is true. Beyond the content, though, the legal source of the
requirements is also unclear. The Court provides no illuminating
citations and no explanation.52 One possibility, of course, is that
they come from the historical practice itself. In other words,
perhaps the reasoning is that the historical practice of legislative
prayer, in its entirety, over nearly two-hundred years, has
consistently not advanced, proselytized, or disparaged any faith,
belief, or church and that therefore, to fit into that tradition, a
contemporary prayer practice must not do any of those things
either. But the Court made no effort whatsoever to demonstrate
that the historical practice failed to do those things, and indeed it
did not even assert such a conclusion. It seems likely that in some
ways, in some times and places, the practice of legislative prayer
certainly did do some of those things, at least to some degree.
The better way to read this part of Marsh is that the
requirement of non-advancement/proselytization/disparagement is

49.
50.
51.
52.

Id.
Id. at 793–94.
Id. at 794–95.
Id. at 793.
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an independent requirement beyond the mere “consistent with
historic practice” criteria that justifies legislative prayer under the
Establishment Clause in the first instance. Not only did the Court
make no attempt to ground the requirements in the historical
practice itself, but the requirements are consistent with general
Religion Clause jurisprudence outside the legislative prayer
context. Even by 1983, the Court had set out the general rules that
the government may not advance or inhibit or endorse or
disapprove of religion, and although the Court in Marsh notoriously
refused to apply the Lemon test to the practice of legislative prayer,
the requirements of non-advancement and non-disparagement are
closely aligned with that test.53
In Town of Greece, the divided Court applied Marsh to uphold
a northern New York town’s practice of starting its board meetings
off with a prayer.54 The practice differed from the practice in Marsh
in several key ways—the prayers were given by guest speakers
rather than an official chaplain; they were fully sectarian in the
sense that they regularly and substantially referred to specific
aspects of the Christian faith (in Marsh, Chaplain Palmer had
stopped referring to Christ after a Jewish legislator complained55);
and they were given in the context of a town meeting, attended by
members of the community, some of whom at any given meeting
might have had business before the board, rather than before a
legislative body.56 Five Justices held that none of these differences
rendered Greece’s practice unconstitutional, resting their decision
largely on a straightforward application of Marsh, which Justice
Kennedy described “stands for the proposition that it is not
necessary to define the precise boundary of the Establishment
Clause where history shows that the specific practice is
permitted.”57 At the same time, however, the Court made it clear
that “Marsh must not be understood as permitting a practice that
53. See id. at 792–95; see also Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13
(1971) (articulating what would be known as the Lemon test as: “First, the
statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the
statute must not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with religion.’”
(citations omitted)).
54. See Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 591–92 (2014).
55. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 793 n.14.
56. For the facts of the case, see Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 570–72.
57. Id. at 577.
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would amount to a constitutional violation if not for its historical
foundation.”58
Specifically, as to the sectarian nature of the prayers in Town
of Greece, the Court observed that such explicitly sectarian
language had been common at the time of the framing of the
Establishment Clause and thus fit within the relevant historic
tradition. “The Congress that drafted the First Amendment[,]”
Justice Kennedy wrote, “would have been accustomed to
invocations containing explicitly religious themes of the sort
respondents find objectionable.”59 As in Marsh, however, the Court
did not end its analysis with history alone. Reiterating Marsh’s
point that the content of legislative prayers is irrelevant absent an
“indication that the prayer opportunity has been exploited to
proselytize or advance any one, or to disparage any other, faith or
belief,”60 the Court this time around provided some details about
what might constitute advancement, disparagement, or
proselytization:
In rejecting the suggestion that legislative prayer must be
nonsectarian, the Court does not imply that no constraints
remain on its content. The relevant constraint derives from
its place at the opening of legislative sessions, where it is
meant to lend gravity to the occasion and reflect values
long part of the Nation’s heritage. Prayer that is solemn
and respectful in tone, that invites lawmakers to reflect
upon shared ideals and common ends before they embark
on the fractious business of governing, serves that
legitimate function. If the course and practice over time
shows that the invocations denigrate nonbelievers or
religious minorities, threaten damnation, or preach
conversion, many present may consider the prayer to fall
short of the desire to elevate the purpose of the occasion
and to unite lawmakers in their common effort. That
circumstance would present a different case than the one
presently before the Court.61

58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. at 576.
Id. at 578.
Id. at 581.
Id. at 582–83.
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This passage further underscores that general conformity with
historical tradition is necessary but not sufficient to uphold any
given legislative prayer practice. The requirement that the prayer
practice also fails to advance, denigrate, or proselytize is an
independent one that is derived not from historical practice—
indeed, as in Marsh, the Court in Greece does not assert, much less
make any effort to support, the notion that the historical practice
failed to do any of these things—but rather from the current
purposes of legislative prayer in the modern day, which the Court
identified as lending gravity to the occasion and reflecting historical
values (which of course may not have always been realized) of
“shared ideals and common ends.”62 Read together with the Court’s
earlier observation that “Marsh must not be understood as
permitting a practice that would amount to a constitutional
violation if not for its historical foundation,”63 this passage makes
it fairly clear that legislative prayer practices are subject to
constitutional requirements beyond simply being generally aligned
with the nation’s historical practice.
Further support for this reading of Town of Greece comes from
Justice Kennedy’s treatment of the plaintiffs’ argument that town
board prayers are unconstitutionally coercive in a way that
legislative prayers are not. In rejecting this argument, Justice
Kennedy, writing only for himself, the Chief Justice, and Justice
Alito, clearly recognized that a prayer practice may not coerce
attendees into participating in the prayer.64 This requirement,
however, was not drawn from any historical tradition, but rather
from an independent constitutional source, specifically the
“elemental First Amendment principle that government may not
coerce its citizens ‘to support or participate in any religion or its
exercise.’”65 Justice Kennedy found, based on the facts in the
record, that Greece had not “compelled its citizens to engage in a
religious observance,”66 but he further observed that “[t]he analysis
would be different if town board members directed the public to
participate in the prayers, singled out dissidents for opprobrium, or
62. Id. at 583.
63. Id. at 576.
64. Id. at 591.
65. Id. at 586 (quoting County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 659
(1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part)).
66. Id. at 587.
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indicated that their decisions might be influenced by a person’s
acquiescence in the prayer opportunity.”67 Again, Justice Kennedy
made no attempt whatsoever to argue that the historical tradition
of town board prayers had been consistently non-coercive in these
ways (indeed, the opinion’s sole reference to the purported
historical tradition of local government prayer consists of one report
of one city council’s proceedings from 191068), thus further lending
support to the argument that avoiding coercion is a constitutional
requirement independent of and additional to general conformity
with historical tradition.
Thus far, then, Marsh and Town of Greece appear to hold that
(1) the government may engage in a practice of starting sessions off
with a prayer without violating the Establishment Clause if the
practice generally fits within the historical tradition of such prayers
in the United States, so long as (2) the practice does not advance a
religious belief, denigrate non-believers or minorities, or
proselytize/preach conversion, and (3) the practice does not coerce
nonbelievers into participating in the prayer. Requirements two
and three seem to have their source in fairly noncontroversial
readings of the First Amendment and are to be measured
independently of any historical tradition.
The final doctrinal piece of Town of Greece is its requirement of
nondiscrimination, which should be understood in the same way as
the requirements of non-advancement, non-disparagement, nonproselytization, and non-coercion—in other words, as an
independent constitutional obligation. In response to the argument
that “the town of Greece contravened the Establishment Clause by
inviting a predominantly Christian set of ministers to lead the
prayer,”69 the Court was satisfied that the town had both made
“reasonable efforts” to identify the religious organizations within
its borders and had indicated it would “welcome a prayer by any
minister or layman who wished to give one.”70 Justice Kennedy
concluded that: “[s]o long as the town maintains a policy of
nondiscrimination, the Constitution does not require it to search
beyond its borders for non-Christian prayer givers in an effort to

67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. at 588.
Id. at 576.
Id. at 585.
Id.
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achieve religious balancing.”71 Of course, Justice Kennedy did not
expound on what precisely this nondiscrimination requirement
entails or where it comes from, but this failure to specify is
understandable if the requirement simply represents the obvious
First Amendment mandate that the government may not prefer one
belief system over any other belief system and may not discriminate
on the basis of viewpoint in any type of government forum. The
Court might very well have introduced this nondiscrimination
requirement in the same way it introduced its non-coercion
requirement, namely as “an elemental First Amendment
principle.”72 That is certainly how many of the nation’s secular
individuals and organizations understood it, as detailed in the next
Part.
II. SECULAR INVOCATIONS AFTER TOWN OF GREECE

Although secularists had given invocations before public bodies
prior to the Court’s decision in Town of Greece,73 it was that
decision, and specifically Justice Kennedy’s observation about
nondiscrimination, that sparked a substantial increase in the
number of secular invocations that have been given before
legislatures and town boards across the nation. Much of this
increase can be attributed to the concentrated efforts of a small
number of influential secularist and separationist organizations,
such as Americans United for Separation of Church and State
(Americans United), the American Humanist Association (AHA),
the Freedom from Religion Foundation (FFRF), and the Central
Florida Freethought Community (CFFC), all of which pounced on
the Court’s anti-discrimination language to start campaigns aimed
at ensuring and increasing diversity and pluralism in the country’s
prayer practices.
As part of its “Operation Inclusion” program, for example,
Americans United developed legal guidelines for what is and is not
allowed under Town of Greece, drafted a model secular invocation
71. Id. at 585–86.
72. Id. at 586.
73. See, e.g., Invocations from Other Areas, CENT. FLA. FREETHOUGHT
CMTY., https://www.cflfreethought.org/invocations [perma.cc/JY4Y-YQSZ]
(last visited Feb. 8, 2021) (collecting links to invocations both after and before
Town of Greece). According to this source, secular invocations had been given
very occasionally before Town of Greece was decided in 2014, going back at
least until 2004. Id.
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for members and other nonbelievers to use for their own
invocations, and actively began monitoring the practices of
localities to ensure that minorities were being treated fairly and
equally.74 The Operation Inclusion webpage clearly links these
efforts to the Court’s decision in Town of Greece, noting that:
The [Town of Greece] ruling was a bad decision, but the
Court did make it clear that the First Amendment imposes
limits on local governments that open their meetings with
ceremonial prayers. Towns cannot discriminate on the
basis of religion; town leaders cannot lead others in prayers
or integrate worship into the legislative process; and
invocations cannot proselytize or denigrate other belief
systems.75
A key part of Operation Inclusion focuses on mobilizing members to
become actively involved in making sure that if a town or other
locality does maintain a prayer practice, it does so consistent with
the Court’s anti-discrimination mandate:
Operation Inclusion is an initiative to . . . MOBILIZE our
chapters across the country, as well as independent
activists, to certify that the rules are being followed and
that minority perspectives—especially non-Christian and
non-theist viewpoints—are not discriminated against. We
will equip people to approach their local boards and
councils to request the opportunity to offer an opening
message that is inclusive and stresses the importance of
church-state separation. We will establish a vehicle for
activists and other citizens to report back to us when
municipalities discriminate against would-be speakers or
violate the spirit or principles of the Supreme Court’s
decision by not including everyone.76

74. See Operation Inclusion, AMS. UNITED FOR SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND
STATE, https://www.au.org/content/operation-inclusion [perma.cc/ZR23-SAL3]
(last visited Feb. 8, 2021).
75. Id.
76. Id.
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The AHA, for its part, launched its secular invocation program
the very same day that the Court announced Town of Greece.77 In
its May 5, 2014, press release, the AHA observed that:
The Supreme Court’s ruling, authored by Justice Kennedy,
makes clear that local governments must make
“reasonable efforts to identify all of the congregations
located within its borders” and welcome an invocation by
anyone who wishes to give one, regardless of their faith.
The majority decision also states that the policy must be
one of nondiscrimination.78
The program, known as “The Humanist Society,” allows individuals
to apply for approval as “Humanist Invocators,” and includes an
interactive map to help Humanists identify people in their areas
who would be willing and able to give nonreligious invocations.79
Also in 2014, FFRF created its “Nothing Fails Like Prayer”
competition to award five-hundred dollar prizes for the year’s best
secular invocations.80 The prizes have been awarded every year
since and FFRF explicitly intends them to “be a Paine in the
government’s Mass—a Thomas Paine.”81
Perhaps no organization has had as much of an impact on
spreading the practice of secular invocations than the CFFC, a
chapter of FFRF headquartered in the Orlando area. Led by
activist David Williamson, the CFFC engages in a wide variety of
secularist activities, educating members and non-members alike
about the law surrounding state-sponsored religion and serving as
a watchdog group in communities that often cross constitutional

77. See Humanist Group Launches Secular Invocations Program in Response to Supreme Court’s Ruling, AM. HUMANIST ASS’N, https://americanhumanist.org/news/2014-05-humanist-group-launches-secular-invocations-program/ [perma.cc/UC5S-GQVJ] (last visited Feb. 8, 2021).
78. Id.
79. See Humanist Invocations, THE HUMANIST SOC’Y, www.thehumanistsociety.org/invocations [perma.cc/UD8S-J8YV] (last visited Feb. 8, 2021).
80. ‘Nothing Fails Like Prayer’ contest, FREEDOM FROM RELIGION FOUND.,
https://ffrf.org/outreach/nothing-fails-like-prayer
[https://perma.cc/8S4FERHY] (last visited Feb. 8, 2021).
81. Id.
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lines.82 With respect to invocations, the group says this on their
website:
We maintain that religious prayer has no place at local
government meetings since members of the public attend
and participate. However, in light of the May, 2014
Supreme Court decision in Town of Greece v. Galloway, the
best possible action we can take is to ensure that all venues
include diverse perspectives. This includes providing
opportunities for all faith traditions and non-believers
seeking the opportunity to participate and ensuring that no
pattern of prayer exists which denigrates, proselytizes, or
advances any one religion or disparages any other.83
To this end, CFFC members have asked to give (and have given)
secular invocations all over central Florida, in conservative locales
like Volusia, Lake, and Osceola counties.84 The group also keeps
an invaluable running record of all the invocations that its
members have given in central Florida, as well as many secular
invocations given by others in different parts of the country.85 The
website lists and provides links to the text and/or videos for ninety
invocations that members of the organization have given in central
Florida and about forty given by others elsewhere in the country
since the Town of Greece decision was handed down.86
It is not clear exactly how many secular invocations have been
given that are not catalogued on the CFFC website, but there are
some, which suggests that the total number of secular invocations
given in the United States since 2014 is at least somewhat higher
than the one-hundred and thirty or so that are listed.87 Humanists
and other secularists have given invocations across the country,
from Maine to Arizona, from Florida to Washington State.88 Most
of the invocations have taken place before local boards, from small
towns like Shelbyville, Kentucky and Oskaloosa, Iowa to larger
82. See generally CENT. FLA. FREETHOUGHT CMTY., https://www.cflfreethought.org/ (last visited Feb. 8, 2021).
83. CENT. FLA. FREETHOUGHT CMTY., supra note 73.
84. See id.
85. See id.
86. See id.
87. See id.
88. See id.
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cities like New Orleans, Louisiana and Lubbock, Texas.89 Some
have been given before state legislative bodies, including the
Arizona House of Representatives, the Iowa State House, and the
Pennsylvania Senate, among others.90 As I will discuss below,
many of the invocations have gone smoothly, but by no means have
all of them.
It is hard to generalize about the content of these secular
invocations, but certain themes tend to repeat themselves. Many
secular invocations begin by asking the audience specifically not to
bow their heads but instead to look around at the people around
them.
Illustrative is the invocation given by Arizona
Representative Athena Salman, who, in her April 18, 2017, speech
before the Arizona House of Representatives, opened by saying:
“Take a moment to look around you at the people gathered today.
We come from a variety of backgrounds and interests, but the
passion that ignites us; the fire that burns within us; is similar.”91
Likewise, Humanist Luke Douglas started his invocation before the
Scottsdale, Arizona, City Council meeting on January 14, 2020,
with:
Rather than closing our eyes or bowing our heads, it is
customary in a Humanist invocation to keep one’s eyes
open. Look around at your neighbors, your colleagues, your
fellow Human beings. Humanists have no holy books, only
the literature and philosophy of humans who have gone
before, whose ideas stand or fall on their own merit.92
The notion that people should start off a public meeting by
looking around at one’s fellow humans and citizens is consistent
with another primary theme of many secular invocations—the
importance of equality and inclusion. A perfect example of an

89. See id.
90. See id.
91. John Nichols, An Arizona Legislator Gave an Invocation That Didn’t
Mention God. You Won’t Believe What Happened Next., THE NATION (Apr. 21,
2017), https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/an-arizona-legislator-gavean-invocation-that-didnt-mention-god-you-wont-believe-what-happened-next/
[https://perma.cc/45BF-FHLP].
92. Hemant Mehta, Atheist Cites Lucifer in Invocation During Scottsdale
(AZ) City Council Meeting, FRIENDLY ATHEIST (Jan. 17, 2020), https://friendlyatheist.patheos.com/2020/01/17/atheist-cites-lucifer-in-invocation-duringscottsdale-az-city-council-meeting/ [perma.cc/T8ZY-TRZF].
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invocation that invokes inclusivity as a core value is the one given
by Nick Lee, a member of the San Antonio chapter of Americans
United, in September of 2018 before the San Antonio City Council:
This morning, I do not ask you to bow your heads in prayer.
Rather, I draw your attention to the citizens who are
gathered here today to do business with the city. They
come from different economic circumstances and from
ethnic backgrounds. Yet, they all hope to receive from you
an equitable hearing of their concerns. And beyond this
room, I ask you to remember all one-and-a-half million
people whom you are collectively pledged to serve.
Consider the diversity of cultures, economic interests and
religious backgrounds which are represented in this
community. In terms of religion, this includes not only the
many varieties of Christians, but also Jews, Muslims,
Hindus, Sikhs, atheists, and others . . . . These citizens of
San Antonio look to each of you to apply wisdom, integrity,
and rational thinking to the affairs of the city, and to treat
all fairly and without favor.93
A third, fairly common theme found among secular invocations
is the importance and centrality of reason to the human condition,
and specifically to the process of governing in a democratic society.
An example comes from United Coalition of Reason member, Ed
Sweeney, in his invocation before the Upper Arlington City Council
Meeting in Ohio:
In this room, let us cherish and celebrate our shared
humanness and capacity for reason. Let us celebrate our
compassion for the people of our City; the love for our
Constitution and our democracy. Reason has the power to
solve even the most challenging problems, while
cultivating intelligent, moral and ethical interactions

93. Rob Boston, Historic Invocation: For the First Time Ever, A San Antonio City Council Meeting Began With A Secular Reflection—And Americans
United Activists Led the Way, AMS. UNITED FOR SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND
STATE (Nov. 2018), https://www.au.org/church-state/november-2018-churchstate/featured/historic-invocation-for-the-first-time-ever-a-san
[https://perma.cc/T54K-RRK3].
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among people of varying backgrounds and beliefs or nonbeliefs.94
Another example can be found in CFFC member Joseph
Richardson’s invocation in Eustis, Florida, in May of 2017:
It is through reason that, more than 2,200 years ago, with
nothing more than shadows and a little geometry,
Eratosthenes was able to show that the Earth was indeed
a sphere and calculate its circumference to within [one
percent]. It is through reason that 300 years ago we began
the Enlightenment and struggled our way out of the
darkness and superstition of the Middle Ages. Through
reason, Einstein made predictions about the cosmos that
we are still confirming 100 years later. Through reason,
we know that we are intimately connected, not only to
every other human, but also to every living thing. Despite
the advances of reason, we are all wrong about something.
It is a continuous, life-long effort to be “less wrong” and to
use new information and reason to achieve that goal. You
have the opportunity to do that again tonight. You will
receive new information and make decisions about that
information. I urge you to exercise empathy to understand
how your constituents feel, to use compassion to consider
how your decisions will affect them, and to apply reason in
the evaluation of all things.95
As illustrated by the invocation’s phrase, “we know that we are
intimately connected, not only to every other human, but also to
every living thing,” another common theme found in secular
invocations is the celebration of science, nature, and the
relationship between human beings and nature. Consider, for
example, Althena Salman’s 2019 invocation before the Arizona
House of Representatives:

94. Secular Invocation: Ed Sweeney, FREETHOUGHT TODAY (June/July
2017), https://ffrf.org/publications/freethought-today/item/29695-secular-invocation-ed-sweeney [perma.cc/8LEX-A24X].
95. Hemant Mehta, An Atheists’ Godless Invocation in Eustis (FL) is “Corrected” By a Commissioner’s Christian Prayer, FRIENDLY ATHIEST (May 6,
2017), https://friendlyatheist.patheos.com/2017/05/06/an-atheists-godless-invocation-in-eustis-fl-is-corrected-by-a-commissioners-christian-prayer/
[perma.cc/3P36-LP3S].
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Take a moment to reflect on the wonders of the universe.
Bask in the awe and magnificence of the diversity of
nature. Look upon the soaring mountains, the vast seas,
the cloud-studded azure skies. Ponder how living things
became so immensely diverse on our life-giving planet, how
integrated and interdependent is all life meshed on our
wondrous Earth. Can we truly fathom the depth of the
intricacies required to produce and sustain living beings
such as animals, plants, microbes, the engines that support
the survival of such diverse lifeforms on an incredibly
insignificant planet in an insignificant galaxy in an
insignificant corner of an unimaginably immense universe
that may possibly be a single speck floating in a sea of
universes? The wonders of nature dwell deep in the hearts
and minds of all people living on this wondrous rock we call
Earth, as it makes its endless journey around a life-giving
star we call sol. No matter what we may call it, we give
thanks to the awe and inspiring power of nature itself.96
Obviously, any person who delivers a secular invocation will
have their own individual concerns and style and so the content of
any given invocation will be unique to that individual, but the
themes I have described over the past few pages—celebration of
nature, reason, compassion, equality, and inclusivity—are without
a doubt some of the more prominent themes found in these types of
invocations. That should not be surprising, of course, since they are
also some of the more prominent values held by secular
organizations and their members generally.
Although legislative prayer is deeply problematic from the
perspective of keeping religion and the government separate, it
can—if managed correctly—provide some important social benefits.
Specifically, allowing a diverse set of religious and nonreligious
believers to address a political meeting can at least theoretically
serve an important educative function. The speaker is given
several minutes to speak about their core beliefs and values and
how those values should be taken into account during the governing
96. Hemant Mehta, AZ Atheists Lawmaker Gives Invocation, Then Gets
Mocked by Christian Colleague, FRIENDLY ATHIEST (Feb. 13, 2019),
https://friendlyatheist.patheos.com/2019/02/13/az-atheist-lawmaker-gives-invocation-then-gets-mocked-by-christian-colleague/
[https://perma.cc/2CLBELSU].
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process. The audience is largely captive and made up of both civic
leaders and politically-engaged citizens. It is not hard to reimagine
the pre-meeting invocation as a form of teaching. Not only can the
invocation explain to the audience what, objectively, the speaker
and their organization believe, but the speakers themselves can
provide a model for the belief system that they represent. Imagine
an attendee who knows very little about Hinduism, for instance,
and perhaps has never met a Hindu person or heard one speak
about their beliefs. By affording a Hindu speaker the opportunity
to address the audience, the practice of legislative prayer allows the
Hindu speaker to explain what Hindus believe and to provide a
concrete example of a Hindu for the attendee to have in mind as he
or she leaves the meeting to participate in a society that is becoming
more and more diverse every day. Many people of all stripes have
inaccurate and incomplete understandings of religious minorities
and hold stereotypical views about their practitioners. Legislative
prayer programs, assuming they include a diverse set of speakers,
can help address this problem.
The last point, though, is the kicker. To perform their
educative function, the programs must be diverse and include a
pluralistic set of believers and nonbelievers to provide a full picture
of society’s religiosity. A prayer program in which every speaker is
a Christian will be far less educative than one which involves a wide
range of speakers. This is as true with respect to nonbelievers as it
is with minority religious believers. A full religious education must
include education about those who do not believe in any sort of god
in addition to those who believe in all sorts of different gods. What
do secularists believe? Can they be good without god? Are they
outcasts? Dangerous? Do they want to destroy religion or co-exist
with it? So many people in the United States identify as
nonbelievers that there is no way to understand the nation’s
religious landscape without understanding what and how
nonbelievers think.
True religious pluralism must include
nonreligious perspectives on the questions addressed by religion. It
follows that to fulfill their educative potential, legislative prayer
practices must include nonbelievers.
Thus, the silver lining in the cloud that is Town of Greece is
Justice Kennedy’s anti-discrimination warning. It is hardly
surprising that so many minority religious and nonreligious
individuals seized on Justice Kennedy’s admonition to begin asking
towns and other government bodies if they could participate in their
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legislative prayer programs. To the extent that those governmental
bodies have allowed or invited a diverse set of speakers, including
Atheists and other secularists, they should be applauded for
promoting religious pluralism. Every governmental unit that
starts its meetings off with an invocation should include—indeed,
actively solicit—nonbelievers to participate in their program.
Given the benefits of pluralism, as well as the seeming
universality of many secularist values, one might expect that most
places would in fact allow secular invocations. And indeed, the
typical secular invocation has given rise to little if no controversy.
Most secular invocations have gone smoothly, as planned, with no
vocal disapproval from the community. Indeed, when I spoke with
David Williamson in 2015 about the CFFC’s invocation program, he
told me that he has encountered “very little opposition” to the
group’s efforts. One particular example of an invocation that
proceeded without incident occurred in the Town of Greece itself,
when, in October of 2015, atheist Linda Stephens, one of the two
plaintiffs in the Town of Greece v. Galloway case, gave a secular
invocation in front of the very town board that she had sued and
brought all the way to the Supreme Court.97 As I recount in Our
Non-Christian Nation, I visited the town and observed the
invocation and can testify that, other than one guy next to me who
took his hat off when the chairperson of the town board announced
the opening prayer and then put the hat back on when it became
clear there would be no actual “prayer,” the invocation was received
with politeness and respect.98
On the other hand, there have been plenty of secular
invocations that did not go nearly as smoothly as Stephens’ talk
before the Town of Greece board. Examples include the following:
• After Athena Salman’s 2019 invocation before the
Arizona House of Representatives, John Kavanaugh, a
fellow Representative, ridiculed the invocation by
saying: “I would like to introduce my guest: God. God
is in the gallery, as He is everywhere. And the same
God who, by the way, created nature, which

97. Linda Stephens, FREEDOM FROM RELIGION FOUND. (Oct. 20, 2015),
https://ffrf.org/publications/brochures/item/25276-linda-stephens
[https://perma.cc/63Z4-4B3A].
98. See WEXLER, supra note 1, at 80–82.

646 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26:620
purportedly created this tiny speck of a planet in which
this tiny speck of a legislature legislates.”99
• When Joseph Richardson, member of the CFFC, gave
his secular invocation before a town commission
meeting in Eustis, Florida, Commissioner Anthony
Sabatini gave a Christian counter-invocation, calling
upon the “Lord” to “give us the strength to live like your
son Jesus Christ.”100
• At a secular invocation in Lake Forest, Florida, in
December, 2014, given by Atheist Preston Smith, four
out of the five town commissioners, including the
mayor, stood up and walked out of the room.101
• When Aleta Ledendecker, member of the Rationalists
of East Tennessee, gave an invocation in January of
2016 in front of the Oak Ridge City Council, one
councilwoman skipped the invocation, and another one
got up toward the end and walked out. The one who
walked out—Rick Chinn—explained that he “couldn’t
take it anymore” because, in his opinion, “this country
was founded on Christian principles.”102
• After Athena Salman’s April 2017 invocation before the
Arizona House of Representatives, some Republicans
expressed offense, including Majority Leader John
Allen, who explained that invocations “must invoke a
higher power” and that “if you don’t want to pray, don’t
sign up for the prayer.”103
As described earlier, in the Introduction to the Article, several
jurisdictions—specifically,
Brevard
County,
Florida;
the
Pennsylvania House of Representatives; and the United States
99. Mehta, supra note 96.
100. Mehta, supra note 96.
101. Chris Joseph, Lake Worth Commissioners Walk Out During Atheist In(Dec.
9,
2014),
vocation,
BROWARD/PALM BEACH NEW TIMES
https://www.browardpalmbeach.com/news/lake-worth-commissioners-walkout-during-atheist-invocation-6463464 [https://perma.cc/MJ7C-MS9S].
102. Bob Fowler, Oak Ridge council members boycott secular invocation,
KNOXVILLE
NEWS
SENTINEL
(Jan.
12,
2016),
http://archive.knoxnews.com/news/local/oak-ridge-council-members-boycott-secularinvocation-292a2603-fd33-41bf-e053-0100007f1793-365065171.html/
[perma.cc/93RL-V9JW].
103. Mehta, supra note 96.
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House of Representatives—have gone even further than simply
objecting on principle to secular invocations by actually
implementing legal bans on them.104 From the perspective of
religious pluralism, this is a terrible mistake, for the reasons I
explained earlier.
But is it also unconstitutional?
The
constitutional propriety of these bans is the topic of the next Part.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF BANNING SECULAR INVOCATIONS

A. The Cases
1.

Williamson v. Brevard County

The Board of County Commissioners of Brevard County (the
Board) on the central east coast of Florida has long started its public
meetings with a prayer. Four days after the Supreme Court decided
Town of Greece, David Williamson, as the Chair of the CFFC, wrote
a letter to the Chairwoman of the Board asking to give a secular
invocation.105 It took Williamson a second letter to get a response
from the Board, and the response was negative.106 The Board told
Williamson that he could address the Board during the “Public
Comment” portion of the meeting (which takes place at the end) but
could not give the opening invocation, because that was reserved
for prayers invoking a higher power.107 After several other
individuals asked to give secular invocations and several
separationist organizations asked the Board to reconsider its
exclusionary policy, the Board issued an eleven-page Resolution
announcing its formal policy that only those who believe in a higher
power may give the opening invocation at its meetings.108
Secularists were allowed address the Board, but only in the Public
Comment section at the end of the meeting.109
Williamson and several other plaintiffs sued the Board in
federal district court, claiming that the county’s policy violated the

104. See Williamson v. Brevard County., 276 F. Supp. 3d 1260 (M.D. Fla.
2017); Fields v. Speaker of Pa. H.R., 251 F. Supp. 3d 772 (M.D. Pa. 2017);
Barker v. Conroy, 282 F. Supp. 3d 346 (D.D.C. 2017).
105. Williamson, 276 F. Supp. 3d at 1266.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1266–67.
108. Id. at 1269.
109. Id. at 1270–71.
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Establishment Clause, as well as a number of other federal and
state constitutional provisions.110 In a comprehensive opinion,
District Court Judge John Antoon II found for the plaintiffs, finding
that the exclusion of non-theists from the Board’s prayer program
contravened Town of Greece’s anti-discrimination requirement as
well as the Free Speech Clause’s prohibition on viewpoint
discrimination in a designated public forum.111 As part of the
proceedings, the plaintiffs’ lawyers deposed seven county
commissioners and asked them questions about who could and
could not offer opening invocations.112 Some of the answers ranged
far beyond an interest in excluding Atheists and cast doubt on
whether any non-monotheist would ever be allowed to give an
invocation.113 For instance, several commissioners expressed
uncertainty about whether Hindus, as polytheists, would be able to
give invocations.114 Same for Native American religions.115
Several commissioners said they would probably exclude Wiccans
as well.116
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, but
the three-judge panel found the Board’s invocation policy invalid on
narrower grounds than the district court.117 In a unanimous
opinion written by Judge Marcus, the court found the policy
unconstitutional because, taken as a whole, the County
Commission preferred certain religions over others.118 Part of this
conclusion was based on the wording of the Resolution itself, which,
in several places, explicitly expressed a preference for monotheistic
invocations.119 For example, page two of the Resolution stated that,
“[p]rior to the invocation, in recognition of the traditional positive
role faith-based monotheistic religions have historically played in
the community, the Board . . . offer[s] the [presenting] cleric the
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
2019).
118.
119.

Id. at 1271.
Id. at 1299.
Id. at 1279.
Id. at 1279–80.
Id.
Id. at 1280.
Id. at 1279.
See Williamson v. Brevard County, 928 F.3d 1298, 1310 (11th Cir.
See id. at 1299.
See id. at 1311–12.
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opportunity to tell the Board . . . about their religious
organization.”120 Another portion of the Resolution, according to
the court, expressed skepticism about any belief system that
“espouse[s] or promote[s] reason . . . science . . . environmental
factors [and] nature.”121 “At the very least,” wrote the court,
“‘environmental factors’ and ‘nature’ play a significant role in
shaping some traditional Native American religions, not to mention
some newer religions like Wicca.”122
Beyond the language of the Resolution, the deposition
testimony of the Commissioners dismayed, as it: “Reflect[ed] that
the members put into practice the monotheistic preference
endorsed in their written Resolution, and shows that members of
the Board had no standards to apply, and minimal procedures to
follow, as they invited speakers to give invocations.”123
On the basis of the Resolution’s language and the deposition
testimony, the court concluded that the Commissioners “have
favored some religions over others, and barred those they did not
approve of from being considered . . . plainly violat[ing] the principle
of denominational neutrality found at the heart of the
Establishment Clause.”124 The court remanded the case back to the
district court with the expectation that the Commissioners would
have a chance to “return to the drawing board and formulate new
policies about how to begin the meetings.”125 As a result, the court
did not specifically address the question of “whether the County is
obliged to allow . . . atheists and Secular Humanists . . . the
opportunity to deliver an invocation at the start of one of its board
meetings.”126

120. Williamson, 276 F. Supp. 3d at 1279 (quoting Brevard Coumty, Fla.,
Resolution 2015-101 (July 7, 2015) (emphasis in original)); see also Williamson,
928 F.3d at 1311-12.
121. Williamson, 928 F.3d at 1312.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1312–13.
124. Id. at 1316.
125. Id.
126. Id.
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2.

Barker v. Conroy

Although the U.S. House of Representatives has a permanent,
paid Chaplain on staff to give a prayer at the beginning of each
legislative session (currently the position is held by Father Patrick
J. Conroy, a Catholic Priest127), since 1948 it has also employed a
“guest chaplain” program to allow other individuals who are either
invited by the Chaplain or sponsored by a member of the House to
offer the opening invocation.128 In 2015, Daniel Barker, an atheist
and co-President of the FFRF, asked Father Conroy if he could give
a secular invocation before the House.129 Conroy turned Barker
down on the basis that anyone who gives an invocation before the
House must address a “higher power.”130 Hardly litigation shy,
FFRF promptly sued, challenging the House’s policy as a violation
of the Establishment Clause and Equal Protection Clause, among
other federal laws.131
Both the district court judge (Judge Rosemary Collyer) and a
three-judge panel of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals held in favor
of the House. Judge Collyer’s constitutional analysis took up a
mere three pages of text and basically boiled down to the following
three sentences:
Despite Mr. Barker’s repeated attempts to characterize his
claims as not challenging the constitutionality of legislative
prayer, the reality is that his request to open the House
with a secular invocation, which resulted in the denial of
his request to serve as a guest chaplain, was a challenge to
the ability of Congress to open with a prayer. To decide
that Mr. Barker was discriminated against and should be
permitted to address the House would be to disregard the
Supreme Court precedent that permits legislative prayer.
Marsh definitively found that legislative prayer does not
violate the Establishment Clause.132

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Barker v. Conroy, 282 F. Supp. 3d 350, 350–51, 354 (D.D.C. 2017).
Id. at 351.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 351–52.
Id. at 364.
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With liberal judges David Tatel and Harry Edwards assigned
to the D.C. Circuit panel hearing the appeal in Barker v. Conroy
(the third judge was conservative Judge Douglas Ginsburg),
pluralists might be forgiven for being optimistic about the case.133
If so, though, they were disappointed by the decision, which gave
short shrift to Barker’s weighty claims, summarily affirming the
district court in a few pages of thinly reasoned analysis.134 After
reviewing Marsh and Town of Greece, Judge Tatel’s opinion
distilled a simple “two-step process for assessing the
constitutionality of a particular legislative prayer practice: identify
the essential characteristics of the practice and then determine
whether that practice falls within the tradition the Supreme Court
has recognized as consistent with the Establishment Clause.”135
After identifying the “essential characteristic” at issue with the
House’s prayer practice as “limit[ing] the opening prayer to
religious prayer,”136 the court then asked whether this “fit ‘within
the tradition long followed in Congress and the state
legislatures’?”137 “The answer,” wrote the court, “is yes”:138
Marsh and Town of Greece leave no doubt that the Supreme
Court understands our nation’s longstanding legislativeprayer tradition as one that, because of its ‘unique history,’
can be both religious and consistent with the
Establishment Clause. . . . And although the Court has
warned against discriminating among religions or
tolerating a pattern of prayers that proselytize or disparage
certain faiths or beliefs, it has never suggested that
legislatures must allow secular as well as religious prayer.
In the sui generis context of legislative prayer, then, the

133. See Mike Leonard, Atheist Loses Bid to Serve as U.S. House ‘Guest
Chaplin,’ BLOOMBERG LAW (Apr. 19, 2019), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/uslaw-week/atheist-loses-bid-to-serve-as-house-guest-chaplain
[https://perma.cc/F8PS-LJ5S].
134. See Barker v. Conroy, 921 F.3d 1118, 1131–32 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
135. Id. at 1129–30.
136. Id. at 1130.
137. Id.
138. Id.
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House does not violate the Establishment Clause by
limiting its opening prayer to religious prayer.139
This was pretty much the entirety of the court’s reasoning.
3. Fields v. Speaker of the Pennsylvania House of
Representatives
Like the U.S. House of Representatives, the Pennsylvania
House also utilizes a guest chaplain program to allow non-members
who are nominated by members to give the opening invocation.
After several members of secular organizations requested the
opportunity to “offer uplifting and inspirational messages” at the
beginning of a House session,140 the House responded by amending
its internal rules to add House Rule 17: “[t]he Chaplain offering the
prayer shall be a member of a regularly established church or
religious organization or shall be a member of the House of
Representatives.”141 The rejected secularists sued, challenging the
exclusion of non-believers from the House’s prayer practice as a
violation of the Establishment Clause, among other constitutional
provisions.142 The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint
under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.143
In April 2017, Chief District Judge Christopher Conner issued
an opinion denying in part defendants’ motion to dismiss, finding
that the plaintiffs had indeed stated a claim under the
Reading Town of Greece’s antiEstablishment Clause.144
discrimination mandate as an independent constitutional
requirement, the court found that the plaintiffs had successfully
pled a colorable case of discrimination:
Town of Greece installs a new metric in the legislative
prayer analysis: when a legislature opens its door to guest
chaplains and other prayer givers, it may not purposefully
discriminate among them on the basis of religion. The
139.
140.
2017).
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id. at 1131.
Fields v. Speaker of the Pa. H.R., 251 F. Supp. 3d 772, 776 (M.D. Pa.
Id. at 777 (quoting GEN. OPERATING RULES OF THE PA. H.R. r. 17).
Id. at 778.
See id. at 778–79.
Id. at 792.
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complaint articulates a plausible violation of this tenet.
Plaintiffs allege that they are members of . . . minority
religions, and that they have been purposefully excluded
from the House’s guest chaplain program on the basis of
their beliefs.145
The court further explained that the more difficult questions posed
by the case—“whether history and tradition sanctify the House’s
line of demarcation between theistic and nontheistic chaplains,” for
instance—“demands, and deserves” the type of factual record that
could only be developed beyond the 12(b)(6) stage.146
Following discovery and the filing of cross-motions for
summary judgment, Judge Conner issued an opinion in August of
2018 finding that the Pennsylvania House had violated the
Establishment Clause by excluding atheist invocations.147 The
court began its analysis by finding that nothing in the historical
record demonstrated a tradition of explicitly excluding nonbelievers from giving invocations. “That history has tolerated the
natural prevalence of theistic legislative prayer,” Judge Conner
wrote, “is hardly evidence that the Framers would abide deliberate
and categorical exclusion of nontheists.”148 Further, the court
observed that while Justice Kennedy’s anti-discrimination
language in Town of Greece might have technically been dicta, the
admonition was nonetheless persuasive and consistent with the
goal of protecting religious diversity, one of the key purposes of the
Establishment Clause.149 After reviewing the district court
decisions in Williamson and Barker and finding the former to be far
more persuasive than the latter,150 the court concluded its analysis
by rejecting the House’s argument that secular invocations cannot
fulfill the purposes of legislative prayer, particularly the solicitation
of “divine guidance for the benefit of the legislatures.”151 Rather,
the court explained, secular invocations, as evidenced by the many
145.
146.
147.
2018).
148.
149.
150.
151.

Id. at 789.
Id.
Fields v. Speaker of the Pa. H.R., 327 F. Supp. 3d 749, 766 (M.D. Pa.
Id. at 758.
Id. at 759–60.
Id. at 761–63.
Id. at 763.
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such invocations given in recent years, are fully capable of
solemnizing the legislative process, lending gravity to the situation,
and, as Justice O’Connor once put it, “encouraging the recognition
of what is worthy of appreciation in society.”152
The secularist victory at the district court level in Fields was
short-lived, however. In August of 2019, a divided Third Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s decision.153 The
reasoning of the majority opinion, written by Judge Ambro, was
quite similar to Judge Tatel’s analysis in Barker but somewhat
more thorough. The majority applied a historical framework and
found that the exclusion of secularists was “historically sound” both
because “only theistic prayer can satisfy all the traditional purposes
of legislative prayer,”154 including “seek[ing] ‘divine guidance’ in
lawmaking,”155 and because “the Supreme Court has long taken as
given that prayer presumes invoking a higher power.”156 The court
conceded that atheism and other secular belief systems could be
understood as “religious” by contemporary standards, but found the
possibility to be beside the point because even if it were true, an
atheist invocation still could not fulfill the “divine guidance”
purpose of legislative prayer.157 The court was careful to reject the
House’s position that it need only allow more than one sect to
partake in the prayer context, noting, for example, that “our
reasoning today could not be twisted to exclude Buddhists—an
outcome we agree would be ‘unconscionable,’”158 but it did not think
it necessary to extend the nondiscrimination mandate of Town of
Greece to nontheists.159 As a final point, the majority argued that
a contrary result might cause “fringe” groups to seek to partake in
the prayer practice, thus causing cities and towns to end their
invocation programs altogether.160 “If, in the name of

152. Id. at 763 (citing Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 693 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring)).
153. Fields v. Speaker of the Pa. H.R., 936 F.3d 142 (3d Cir. 2019).
154. Id. at 147, 150.
155. Id. at 151.
156. Id. at 150.
157. Id. at 153–54.
158. Id. at 155.
159. Id. at 155–56.
160. Id. at 157.
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nondiscrimination, the House must abide prayers from nontheists,
Satanists, and groups that deride religion,” the court wrote, “it will
stop accepting guest chaplains altogether . . . result[ing] in less
diversity of religious expression—a ‘particularly perverse
result.’”161
Judge Restrepo wrote a substantial dissent.162 For him, the
key historical inquiry was whether the express exclusion of
nontheists was part of the historical practice of legislative
prayer.163 The answer to that question, as Judge Restrepo put it,
was “clearly ‘no’”164—indeed, it is clear from Senate and House
documents issued in 1853, reviewing the prayer practices of both
bodies, that the “history [of] legislative prayer never involved the
purposeful exclusion of persons from consideration to serve as
chaplains on the basis of their religions or religious beliefs.”165 The
dissent did not stop there, however. Moving on from his historical
analysis and quoting Town of Greece’s warning that “Marsh must
not be understood as permitting a practice that would amount to a
constitutional violation if not for its historical foundation,”166 Judge
Restrepo argued that even if the House’s practice was historically
sound, it would still violate the Establishment Clause because it
discriminated against nonbelievers. He emphasized:
By mandating that all guest chaplains profess a belief in a
“higher power” or God, the Pennsylvania House fails to stay
“neutral in matters of religious theory”; in effect, the
Pennsylvania House “promote[s] one . . . religious theory”—
belief in God or some sort of supreme deity—“against
another”—the denial of the existence of such a deity.167
As I will argue in the next Section of this Part, Judge Restrepo’s
approach to the question of whether the government can exclude
secularists from its invocation practices makes the most sense of
any that the judiciary has put forward up until now.
161. Id.
162. See id. at 163–71 (Restrepo, J., dissenting).
163. Id. at 165.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 166.
166. Id. at 167–68 (quoting Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 576
(2014)).
167. Id. at 168.
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B. Evaluating the Constitutionality of Secularist Exclusion
Policies
Two observations are worth making at the outset of figuring
out how to apply Marsh and Town of Greece to the practice of
excluding secularists from giving opening invocations, one that
should be uncontroversial, the other somewhat more so. First,
anyone trying to figure out how these cases should be applied to
new situations has to recognize and concede that there will be no
clear or obvious answers. In both cases, the Court announced one
test (the historical practice test) without explaining in detail how to
apply it, and then almost as an afterthought announced additional
criteria (non-disparagement and nondiscrimination) without
explaining what the criteria mean, how they should be applied, or
even what the legal source or sources of the criteria are.168 By using
such a minimalist approach to resolving the cases on the specific
facts at issue, the Court has guaranteed that lower courts will
rightly be confused about how to apply the cases, and commentators
who argue that they should be applied one way or another should
admit the same. Thus, the analysis I provide in the balance of the
Article should be understood in that way—I will put forward what
I believe is the best understanding of how Marsh and Town of
Greece should be applied to atheist exclusion policies, but I am
hardly claiming that this understanding is obvious or that other
understandings are necessarily unreasonable.
The second observation—the one that is likely to be more
controversial—is that Marsh, because of its highly anomalous
approach and exceedingly thin reasoning, should be read as
narrowly as possible. In the dissent he wrote for himself, Justice
Marshall, joined by Justice Stevens and Justice Brennan,
catalogued the various ways that legislative prayer infringes on the
values represented by the Establishment Clause:
Legislative prayer clearly violates the principles of
neutrality and separation that are embedded within the
Establishment Clause . . . . It intrudes on the right of
conscience by forcing some legislators either to participate
in a “prayer opportunity” with which they are in basic
disagreement, or to make their disagreement a matter of
168. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 783 (1983); see also Town of
Greece v. Galloway 572 U.S. 565, 585–88 (2014).
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public comment by declining to participate. It forces all
residents of the State to support a religious exercise that
may be contrary to their own beliefs. It requires the State
to commit itself on fundamental theological issues. It has
the potential for degrading religion by allowing a religious
call to worship to be intermeshed with a secular call to
order. And it injects religion into the political sphere by
creating the potential that each and every selection of a
chaplain, or consideration of a particular prayer, or even
reconsideration of the practice itself, will provoke a
political battle along religious lines and ultimately alienate
some religiously identified group of citizens.169
Justice Brennan then concluded with a line quite remarkable in the
history of Religion Clause jurisprudence both for its truth and its
candor: “I have no doubt that, if any group of law students were
asked to apply [established principles] to the question of legislative
prayer, they would nearly unanimously find the practice to be
unconstitutional.”170 To put it another way, although many
difficult cases arise under the Establishment Clause, the case of
legislative prayer is not one of them—it is clearly unconstitutional.
The majority opinion, strikingly, neither applied established
principles, eschewing the application of the Lemon test or anything
like it, nor addressed in any way Justice Brennan’s various
arguments against the practice of legislative prayer.171 Given the
weakness of the opinion’s reasoning, there is no good reason for it
to be extended beyond its precise holding—that a legislature can
begin its session with a prayer without violating the Establishment
Clause.172 The resolution of other related or subsidiary questions
need not replicate the original failures of Marsh through an
unreflective extension of its core holding. Issues like the one I am
discussing here should therefore not proceed through the routine
application of the most anomalous and poorly reasoned
Establishment Clause case in history, but rather through
application of more generally accepted principles of the
Establishment and Free Speech Clauses of the First Amendment.
169.
170.
171.
172.

Marsh, 463 U.S. at 808 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 800–01.
See id. at 783–824.
Id. at 783.
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With these observations, then, we can begin to evaluate the
decisions of the Third and D.C. Circuits in Fields and Barker. As a
first step, recall the reading of Marsh and Town of Greece set out
earlier in Part I of the Article. According to that reading, those
cases stand for the proposition that the government may engage in
a practice of starting sessions off with a prayer without violating
the Establishment Clause if the practice generally fits within the
historical tradition of such prayers in the United States, so long as
(1) the practice does not advance a religious belief, denigrate nonbelievers or minorities, or proselytize/preach conversion; (2) the
practice does not coerce non-believers into participating in the
prayer; and (3) the practice is non-discriminatory.173
This approach differs significantly from Judge Tatel’s
framework in Barker v. Conroy, which basically included only one
inquiry, divided into two steps: “identify the essential
characteristics of the practice and then determine whether that
practice falls within the tradition the Supreme Court has
recognized as consistent with the Establishment Clause.”174 The
problem with this approach is several-fold. First, it ignores Town
of Greece’s warning that “Marsh must not be understood as
permitting a practice that would amount to a constitutional
violation if not for its historical foundation.”175 An approach that
asks solely whether the essential characteristics of a practice fall
within historical tradition by its very terms would permit some
practices that would in fact amount to constitutional violations.
Examples of this constitute the second problem with Judge Tatel’s
approach, which is that it would allow clearly unconstitutional and
undesirable practices—given that almost everyone who ever gave
an invocation in the course of that historical practice was surely
male, white, and Christian.
Judge Tatel’s approach would
presumably allow a town or state to prohibit Black or Asian or
Hispanic individuals from giving invocations or to exclude women
from giving prayers or to limit those prayers to only Christian ones.
Finally, Judge Tatel’s framework leaves no room for the dicta of
Marsh and Town of Greece concerning non-denigration,
nondiscrimination, and non-proselytization; although that

173. See supra Part I.
174. See Barker v. Conroy, 921 F.3d 1118, 1129–30 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
175. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 576 (2014).
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language is dicta, it was clearly intended to be meaningful, and
most courts that have looked at it have agreed.176
Applying the framework that I have suggested, then, the first
question is whether exclusion of atheists fits within the historical
tradition of legislative prayer. This question immediately leads to
a second question: what exactly should we be looking for in the
historical tradition to determine whether formal legal exclusion of
secularists fits within that tradition? We know from the expert
report filed in Fields, as well as the 1853 House and Senate Reports
on Congressional prayer, that (1) secularist invocations were not in
fact part of the historical tradition because they never actually
occurred, and that (2) they were likely never formally excluded by
law, as they have been in the Pennsylvania and U.S. Houses as well
as in Brevard County.177 So, does this mean that formal legal
exclusion of secular invocations fits or does not fit within the
historical tradition? The dissent in Fields argues for the latter,
finding that formal legal exclusion of secularists does not comport
with the historical tradition.178 Judge Restrepo wrote: “[h]istory
demonstrates that legislative prayer, as envisioned by the First
Congress and as subsequently practiced by Congress since then,
never involved the purposeful exclusion of persons from
consideration to serve as chaplains on the basis of their religions or
religious beliefs.”179
This is a strong argument, in my view, particularly if one
accepts my position that Marsh should be read as narrowly as
possible. The argument essentially says that unless discriminatory
practices were explicitly written into the law during the historical
period, then those practices cannot be used to justify current
discrimination; it is a position that makes it more difficult rather
than less difficult for the government to discriminate on the basis
of religion and other essential characteristics, which is a result that
seems self-evidently desirable. On the other hand, it is certainly
possible that the Court intended its historical tradition test to be
applied less formalistically and that the sole question really should
be whether secular invocations were common during the historical
176. See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 794–95; Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 585.
177. See Fields v. Speaker of the Pa. H.R., 936 F.3d 142, 165–66 (3d Cir.
2019) (Restrepo, J., dissenting).
178. See id. at 166.
179. Id. (emphasis in original).
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period. That is the view of Judge Tatel in Barker and to some
degree the majority opinion in Fields.180 Although I think the
Fields’ dissent is probably the better view, it also becomes
unnecessary if Town of Greece’s nondiscrimination proviso is taken
seriously. For that reason, if I were the one writing the opinion on
this issue, I would likely not reach the historical tradition question
and turn instead directly to applying Justice Kennedy’s
nondiscrimination mandate.
Doing that, and moving on to the fourth inquiry of my
restatement of Marsh and Town of Greece, the question becomes
whether excluding atheists and other secularists from giving
invocations counts as “discrimination.” Discrimination, of course,
can mean many things, but given the seemingly constitutional
source of the nondiscrimination requirement and the specific
setting posed by issues of legislative prayer, two dimensions of the
Court’s nondiscrimination jurisprudence seem most relevant: the
requirement that the government treat all religions equally and the
requirement that the government not distinguish among speakers
in a designated public forum based on their viewpoint. Both of
these requirements point in the same direction—excluding
secularist invocations is unconstitutional.
First, the proposition that the government may not favor one
religion over another religion is about as fundamental as any
principle can be under the Religion Clauses. As the Court famously
put it in the 1982 case of Larson v. Valente, “[t]he clearest command
of the Establishment Clause is that one religious denomination
cannot be officially preferred over another.”181 In the context of
legislative invocations, this must mean that the government cannot
favor those who believe in a god or many gods over those who
sincerely believe that there is no god or higher power. Whatever
one may think about whether atheism, or other comprehensive
belief systems that reject the existence of a god, constitute
“religions” outside of the constitutional context, it has to be the case
that they are religions for purposes of the Establishment Clause.
Otherwise, the government could promote the idea that there is no
god as literal truth—a view that virtually nobody believes is correct.
Even the majority opinion in Fields recognized that groups that
180. See Barker v. Conroy, 921 F.3d 1118, 1130 (D.C. Cir. 2019); Fields, 936
F.3d at 1149.
181. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982).
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deny the existence of god are properly understood as “religions,”
when it stated the following: “The nontheistic organizations that
brought this challenge may be ‘religions’ for First Amendment
purposes. Indeed, the Supreme Court has moved considerably
beyond the wholly theistic interpretation of the term religion. Its
understanding of religion now includes nontheistic and atheistic
beliefs, as well as theistic ones.”182 It may be the case that allowing
someone to give a Christian prayer before a legislative session does
not violate the Establishment Clause, but that most definitely does
not mean that the legislature can allow someone to give a Christian
invocation but refuse to allow someone who does not believe in god
to give a similar invocation. The former proposition follows from
Marsh and Town of Greece, but the latter does as well, through
Town
of
Greece’s
common-sense,
fundamental-principleincorporating, nondiscrimination requirement.183
Second, the idea that under the First Amendment’s Free
Speech Clause the government may not discriminate against
speakers on the basis of the viewpoint that they are espousing is
only slightly less fundamental than the requirement of
denominational neutrality under the Religion Clauses. As the
Court wrote in the flag-burning case of Texas v. Johnson: “[i]f there
is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that
the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply
because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”184
Nor does this principle change simply because the speech takes
place on government property or within the context of a government
institution. In those cases, the proper analysis looks to the so-called
public-forum doctrine, which dictates that regardless of whether
the speech is taking place in a traditional public forum, a
designated public forum, or even a non-public forum, the
government may still not discriminate against speech on the basis
of viewpoint.185 Indeed, this is the principle under which the
Supreme Court has held repeatedly that if a public school opens its
182. Fields, 936 F.3d at 153 (citations omitted).
183. See Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 585–86 (2014).
184. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989).
185. See, e.g., Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473
U.S. 788, 806 (1985) (“[A]ccess to a nonpublic forum can be based on subject
matter and speaker identity so long as the distinctions drawn are reasonable
in light of the purpose served by the forum and are viewpoint neutral.”).
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property for use by after-school clubs and the like, it cannot exclude
religious groups from using that property on the same terms that
nonreligious groups are allowed to use it.186 Although it is not
entirely clear whether a legislative invocation program is best
characterized as a designated public forum or a non-public forum
(my own view is that it is best understood as a designated public
forum because it is intentionally opened up for a good deal of
speech), ultimately it does not matter since even in a non-public
forum, the Court has held that regulations of speech in such a place
must be both reasonable and viewpoint-neutral.187 By allowing
religious people of all different sects and stripes to give invocations
but excluding those who do not believe in any divine being from
speaking, the various jurisdictions that have adopted secularist
exclusion policies have clearly discriminated against secularists on
the basis of their viewpoint. Finding this exclusion unconstitutional
should therefore not be a particularly difficult task.
Although a straight-forward application of the relevant cases
and constitutional principles should be sufficient to invalidate
secularist exclusion policies, any judge or court who feels it either
necessary or desirable to consider the pragmatic consequences of a
decision one way or the other on the issue should find convincing
practical reasons to find exclusion of secularists unconstitutional.
These reasons are detailed above188 and involve, first and foremost,
the importance of religious pluralism in public life. From the
perspective of religious pluralism, legislative prayer practices
ought to strive to include speakers representing as many religious
and nonreligious traditions as possible. This must include not only
representatives of minority religious beliefs, but those of
nonreligious belief systems as well. Allowing secularists and other
nonbelievers to give occasional invocations before legislatures and
town meetings will empower members of an otherwise
marginalized group, send a symbolic message that everyone is an
equal member of the community, and allow secularists to teach
others what it means to be a nonbeliever, thus perhaps even leading
to mutual understanding, respect, and social peace. And, as the
dissent in Fields persuasively explained, nothing is lost by allowing
186. See, e.g., Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508
U.S. 384 (1993).
187. See Barker v. Conroy, 921 F.3d 1118, 1129–30 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
188. See id.
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nonbelievers to give invocations; a secular invocation is just as
capable of lending gravity to the meeting and performing the other
functions of legislative prayer as religious invocations are.189
None of this is to say that legislatures and town boards are
foreclosed from placing some guidelines on what kinds of
invocations can be given. Obviously, nobody is entitled to give an
invocation about topics that are completely unrelated to the
legislative or governing process; there is no constitutional right to
give a speech before a town meeting about one’s favorite hockey
team or broccoli preparation method. Fortunately, exclusion of
such invocations would not be unconstitutional. For one thing, as
those invocations are neither about religion nor inspired by religion
in any way, excluding them would not violate the denominational
neutrality principle of Larson v. Valente. Moreover, because the
Court has held that the government can insist on subject matter
distinctions (as opposed to viewpoint-based distinctions) in both
limited public forums and nonpublic forums, it should be possible
for legislatures and other governing bodies to craft, if they so
choose, a rule limiting invocations to ruminations about how
fundamental beliefs about the world relate to the governing
process. Of course, there may be difficulties with such a rule at the
margins, but that is hardly a reason not to adopt a rule in the first
place. In order to ensure that the state does not discriminate on the
basis of religious viewpoint, however, I would suggest something
like the following standard: the government may not exclude from
its invocation program any speaker who represents a belief system
that, if it were taught by a public school as truth (or otherwise
declared as truth by the government), it would violate the
Establishment Clause’s prohibition on advancement of religion. As
noted above, since public schools clearly cannot teach atheism or
nonbelief as truth, secularists must be included in the set of people
who are allowed to give invocations. 190
One final point about the majority’s decision in Fields is worth
making. The majority in that case argued that requiring the
inclusion of nonbelievers in invocation programs would lead to
“voices on the fringe” demanding the right to speak, which would in

189. Fields v. Speaker of the Pa. H.R., 936 F.3d 142, 170 (2019) (Restrepo,
J., dissenting).
190. See id. at 166.
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turn cause governmental bodies to cancel their guest invocation
practices altogether, a negative result. The court wrote:
Taken too far, a nondiscrimination rule in legislative
prayer provides a heckler’s veto to voices on the fringe. If,
in the name of nondiscrimination, the House must abide
prayers from nontheists, Satanists, and groups that deride
religion, it will stop accepting guest chaplains altogether.
This will result in less diversity of religious expression—a
“particularly perverse result.” . . . In matters of promoting
religious diversity, the perfect should not be the enemy of
the good.191
This observation suffers from several serious problems. For
one thing, since Satanists are in fact religious,192 Town of Greece
already clearly prohibits the government from excluding them from
invocation practices on the basis of their viewpoint, so inclusion of
atheists in addition to Satanists seems unlikely to, by itself, have
the feared effect. But, more importantly, the paragraph gets
constitutional law exactly backward. The nondiscrimination
mandates that flow from various constitutional provisions are
designed to protect voices on the fringe. That is their purpose.
Popular voices do not need constitutional protection because they
will prevail in the democratic process. It is precisely the nontheists,
Satanists, and other religious minorities that need and deserve the
protection of the First Amendment. If it turns out that the state is
so worried about letting unpopular minorities speak before
government meetings that it changes its invocation policy to
exclude guest speakers altogether, that is the state’s prerogative,
just as it was the prerogative of localities in the 1950s to close public
swimming pools altogether rather than to allow African-Americans
to swim alongside whites. The state’s intolerance and prejudice
toward minorities, in other words, cannot be used as an argument
in favor of discrimination. The fact that the Third Circuit majority
thought it was proper to rely on such an argument truly renders
most of the rest of its analysis untrustworthy and unpersuasive.

191. Id. at 157.
192. See, e.g., Satanic Temple v. City of Scottsdale, 423 F. Supp. 3d 766,
775–78 (2020).
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CONCLUSION

Over the course of the last few decades, the Supreme Court has
largely reduced the Establishment Clause to an empty shell. As a
result, religion now has greater access to public money, institutions,
and property than perhaps ever before. All of the cases in which
the Court has allowed such increased access have, of course,
involved claims by Christians, and with the results consistently
coming out in their favor, the Christian majority has jumped on
them to infiltrate public life with Christian symbols, speeches, and
messages. But the Supreme Court has also consistently held that
the government may not discriminate on the basis of religion—as a
result, religious minorities of all types, including atheists and other
secularists, have also begun taking advantage of the Court’s
jurisprudence to participate in public life by putting up their own
symbols and displays on public property, starting their own afterschool clubs on public school property, asking for government
funding, and—as detailed in this Article—giving their own
invocations before government bodies.193 This increased religious
pluralism in public life might, from the perspective of minorities,
not be preferable to a secular public square in which the
government supports no religion at all, but it is at least better than
an entirely Christian public square.
The move by several
jurisdictions to exclude secular invocations runs directly counter to
the Court’s nondiscrimination, pro-pluralism approach to the
Establishment Clause and should be rejected. The government
should allow, or indeed even encourage, secularists to partake in
invocation programs in order to promote religious pluralism in
American public life. And, if the government insists on excluding
secularists, then it will be up to the federal courts to hopefully
reverse the current disturbing trend exemplified by the Third and
D.C. Circuits and declare these secular exclusion policies
unconstitutional under both the Religion Clauses and the First
Amendment’s Free Speech Clause.

193. See generally WEXLER, supra note 1.

